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Abstract
The accepted narrative treats John Stuart Mill’s Kinds as the historical
prototype for our natural kinds, but Mill actually employs two separate
notions: Kinds and natural groups. Considering these, along with the
accounts of Mill’s 19th-century interlocutors, forces us to recognize two
distinct questions. First, what marks a natural kind as worthy of inclusion
in taxonomy? Second, what exists in the world that makes a category
meet that criterion? Mill’s two notions offer separate answers to the two
questions: natural groups for taxonomy, and Kinds for ontology. This
distinction is ignored in many contemporary debates about natural kinds
and is obscured by the standard narrative which treats our natural kinds
just as a development of Mill’s Kinds.
This paper concerns debates about classification in the 19th century between
Willaim Whewell (§2), John Stuart Mill (§3), and some lesser known critics (§4).
I aim to show that Mill provides separate answers to two important questions
in the neighborhood of what we would now call natural kinds: The taxonomy
question, about what distinguishes categories which are natural kinds from cate-
gories which are not; and the ontology question, about what there is in the world
which sustains that difference. Mill distinguishes natural groups as an answer
to the taxonomy question and Kinds as an answer to the ontology question for
some — but importantly not all — natural groups. This overturns the usual
story, according to which Mill’s Kinds map neatly on to our natural kinds, and
it also reveals a distinction we would do well to remember.
1 The standard story
The standard narrative, promulgated by Ian Hacking [4], is that the philosophi-
cal conception of natural kinds descends from John Stuart Mill’s notion of Kinds
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(with a capital ‘K’). According to Hacking, this was a central piece of a promis-
ing research program in the mid-19th century which has since degenerated. He
argues that the concept is no longer fruitful and so natural kinds should be
abandoned. In Hacking’s metaphor, Mill’s contribution was the “rosy dawn”
for natural kinds, present debates are a “scholastic twilight”, and the day for
thinking in terms of natural kinds has come to an end [5].
Hacking’s narrative is widely accepted. For example, John Dupre´ gestures
to the history of natural kinds by writing, “Ian Hacking reminded us that the
contemporary tradition of natural kinds arose. . . in the nineteenth century. . . ”
[2, p. vii]. The story has become sufficiently commonplace that some writers
even attribute the phrase ‘natural kind’ to Mill; e.g. Alexander Bird and Emma
Tobin write, “J. S. Mill. . . was one of the first to use the phrase ‘natural kind’ ”
[1]. Mill never used the phrase, however, even though his critics use the phrase
consistently later in the 19th century.1
So the narrative involves two claims of continuity: first, that recent debates
are continuations of ones that began with Mill; second, that the term of Mill’s
system which maps onto our ‘natural kind’ is his ‘Kind’.
Both these claims are mistaken, but my focus here is on the second.2 Mill’s
terms do not map one-to-one onto ours. In addition to Kinds, Mill has an
account of natural groups. Mill’s natural groups and Kinds answer two different
questions about what we call natural kinds.3
The first question is about what, as a matter of taxonomy, distinguishes
natural kinds from arbitrary categories: What criteria must a category satisfy
to count as a natural kind? This is not particularly an epistemic matter, because
we might not and perhaps could never be in a position to apply the criteria.
However, it is metaphysically somewhat thin. An answer to it specifies what a
category must do in order to fulfill the natural kind roˆle, but it need not specify
the fundamental ontology of such categories.
The second question concerns ontology: What kind of being has a natural
kind got? Answers might appeal to causal structure, universals, or primitive
similarity.
Call these the taxonomy and ontology question, respectively.4
The two questions are conflated in many recent discussions of natural kinds.
If we answer the taxonomy question by saying that natural kinds are those
which carve nature at its joints, then we answer the ontology question in terms
1It is unclear exactly when Mill’s Kinds came to be called ‘natural kinds’ as a matter of
jargon. Hacking [4] attributes the phrase ‘natural kinds’ to John Venn, and the attribution is
part of the standard narrative; for example, it is repeated uncritically by Laura Snyder [15,
p. 157, fn. 2]. Although Venn uses the words ‘natural’ and ‘kind’ together, it is unclear that
Venn was responsible for ‘natural kind’ as a fixed phrase; cf. Magnus [9, pp. 2–3].
2Magnus [9] debunks the first claim of continuity, arguing that the recent vogue for natural
kinds is not a continuation of 19th-century debates using the same phrase.
3Hawley and Bird [6] call these the ‘naturalness’ and ‘kindhood’ questions, respectively,
and point out that the distinction is not typically made. I have argued for the importance of
the distinction in the context of Homeostatic Property Cluster accounts [8].
4Even though the labels are mine, rather than Mill’s, it is clear that natural groups and
Kinds play two different roˆles in his system. So (I argue) it is not anachronistic to see them
as answers to different questions.
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of nature’s joints. We discharge both questions at once, and so it would be gra-
tuitous to distinguish them. The same elision occurs in more sophisticated ac-
counts. For David Lewis and followers, natural properties are “an e´lite minority
of special properties” [7, p. 346] and that eliteness is a matter of fundamental
metaphysics. A category is a natural kind if and only if it corresponds to a
natural property, providing taxonomy and ontology altogether. Similar elision
follows for any essentialist account in which natural kinds stand in a one-to-one
relationship with essences.
My central claim here is that Mill gives the two questions importantly differ-
ent answers — as a matter of history, Mill’s categories cannot be neatly mapped
onto contemporary terms. At the end, I briefly suggest how we might profit by
minding the distinction that Mill made in the 19th century but which was lost
in the 20th.
2 Whewell
This section briefly considers some features of William Whewell’s account of
classification. As we will see, Mill explicitly engages Whewell, and the contrast
between their views highlights Mill’s innovation.5
Whewell claims that the aim of taxonomy is to provide a natural classifica-
tion, to divide things into kinds or — as he more often writes — natural classes.
These are the categories that will support systematic induction. He writes that
“since the truths we are to attend to are scientific truths, governed by precise
and homogeneous relations, we must not found our scientific Classification on
casual, indefinite, and unconnected considerations” [18, p. 115].
Importantly, for Whewell, natural classes will support scientific inference
because they reflect the underlying construction of the world. So taxonomy
aims not merely to organize things for science but also to discover the world’s
construction. Discussing mineralogy, Whewell writes, “the science which we
require is a complete and consistent classified system of all inorganic bodies. For
chemistry proceeds upon the principle that the constitution of a body invariably
determines its properties; and consequently, its kind. . . ” [17, p. 189]. Discussing
botany, he writes similarly,
No person, however, who wishes to know botany as a science, that is,
as a body of general truths, can be content with making names his
ultimate object. Such a person will be constantly and irresistibly led
on to attempt to catch sight of the natural arrangement of plants,
5Mill explicitly acknowledges Whewell as providing him the crucial clue to Kinds. He had
stopped working on the Logic for five years, because he was unable to make sense of induction.
But Whewells’ 1837 History of the Inductive Sciences provided him with the comprehensive
survey of physical science which he needed to move ahead. [11] Although Mill found much to
disagree with in Whewell’s philosophy, there are considerable similarities in their accounts of
natural classification. Mill quotes Whewell approvingly on the topic [12, p. 488] and, where
he disagrees, still quotes Whewell at some length [12, p. 501–2]. For more on the relation
between Whewell and Mill on classification, see McOuat [10] and Snyder [15].
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even before he discovers, as he will discover by pursuing such a
course of study, that the knowledge of the natural arrangement is
the knowledge of the essential construction and vital mechanism of
plants. [17, pp. 319–320]
So what makes kinds natural for Whewell is ultimately the “constitution” and
“construction” of things. The taxonomy and ontology questions are answered
together.
3 Mill
Initially in Book I of the Logic, Mill distinguishes Kinds (with a capital-K)
from arbitrary classes. A class can be indicated by any property or list of
properties. For example, the class of white things corresponds to the property
of being white, and the class of red round things corresponds to the properties
of being red and of being round. Because there is a class corresponding to any
property or list of properties, no such class is more natural than any other.
White things have nothing in common beyond their whiteness and its necessary
consequences (e.g., that all white things are non-transparent). In contrast,
Kinds are classes of things which share indefinitely many properties. There are
some diagnostic criteria which we associate with a chemical kind or biological
species, but the members share many properties besides those which we use to
mark the Kind. On Mill’s view, a Kind “is distinguished from all other classes
by an indeterminate multitude of properties not derivable from one another”
[12, p. 99].
For Mill, Kinds are crucial for inductive generalization. Suppose we subject
a sample of phosphorus to an experimental condition in the lab and we infer
that other samples of phosphorus will react similarly. This relies on the other
phosphorus, the stuff outside the lab, sharing enough properties with our sam-
ple that the condition happening to them counts as an instance of the same
cause. We identify other samples of phosphorus merely by diagnostic criteria,
so how can we rely on distinct bits of phosphorus sharing further properties
beyond those used to diagnose them as phosphorus? We can do so, Mill would
say, because phosphorus is a Kind. The diagnostic criteria identify samples as
members of the Kind, assuring that they share indefinitely many other features.
In this example, the fact that all lumps of phosphorus are the same Kind is
crucial to a causal inference about what things like this will do. Yet, because
of Mill’s conception of causation, Kinds cannot themselves be held together by
causes. Mill thinks of causal inference as guided by the law of causation which
states that every event is preceded by some circumstances which necessitate it:
When those circumstances occur, the effect invariably follows [12, p. 410]. This
means that causes are regularities that obtain between prior and subsequent
events.
Kinds are also regularities, but they obtain between different things at the
same time (e.g. all the samples of phosphorus) rather than between events at
different times (e.g. heatings of phosphorus and a subsequent ignitions). For
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a Kind, Mill writes, the the shared properties are an “invariable co-existent, in
the same manner as an event must have an invariable antecedent” [12, bk. III,
ch. XXII]. Kinds are structures of non-causal regularities.
Laura Snyder describes Mill as “denying that kinds are natural” and writes
that Mill’s Kinds “are not real kinds” [15, p. 164]. What she means by this
is that, for Mill, there is no underlying mechanism “causally responsible for
the production of. . . shared superficial qualities” [15, p. 164]. She is correct
that Mill’s Kinds do not have a real essence in Locke’s sense, that there is no
deeper and more fundamental process which causally produces the regularity
observed in members of the Kind. Unlike Whewell, Mill refuses to talk about
the constitution or essential construction of things. However, Mill’s Kinds are
not enquiry dependent or merely nominal.6 Each corresponds to a law of nature,
a law of coexistence which has the same reality as diachronic causal laws. They
are defined in terms of the course of events, rather than in terms of actual or
possible science.
In Book IV, Mill takes up “operations subsidiary to induction” such as ob-
servation, abstraction, naming, and classification. In discussing naming, Mill
explicitly invokes the conception of Kinds which he developed in Book I.7 In dis-
cussing classification, Mill makes a different distinction between natural groups
and merely technical or artificial ones. He says some natural groups will be
Kinds but that not all of them will be. Natural groups — in contrast to Kinds
— are characterized by their function in scientific enquiry.
Properly scientific classification, in order to be as general as possible, should
reflect the causal structure of things. It is best “when the objects are formed
into groups respecting which a greater number of general propositions can be
made. . . . The properties, therefore, according to which objects are classified
should, if possible, be those which are causes of many other properties. . . ” [12,
p. 499]. He distinguishes properly natural classification from artificial classifi-
cation; continuing, “A classification thus formed is properly scientific or philo-
sophical, and is commonly called a Natural, in contradistinction to Technical or
Artificial, classification or arrangement” [12, p. 499]. The categories that figure
in a natural classification he calls natural groups. Mill uses the adjective ‘natu-
ral’ here to discuss natural classification and natural groups, but he never uses
it to modify Kinds. The phrase ‘natural kind’ was not part of his vocabulary.
6Mill writes that “there are in nature distinctions of Kind; distinctions not consisting in
a given number of definite properties plus the effects which follow from those properties, but
running through the whole nature. . . of the things so distinguished” [12, p. 502].
7Mill calls a system of names for Kinds ‘nomenclature’, in contrast to mere ‘terminology’.
Lavoisier’s new chemistry and Linnæus’ system of biology, he writes, provided nomenclature.
The taxonomic innovations allowed enquiry to move beyond parochial concerns, to chart Kinds
rather than mere categories of interest. Having a nomenclature is the mark scientific progress,
Mill thinks, and in other fields a lack of nomenclature “is now the principle cause which retards
the progress of the science” [12, p. 492]. Mill defines ‘nomenclature’ explicitly by reference
to Kinds, as “the collection of names of all the Kinds with which any branch of knowledge
is conversant”[12, p. 492]. He takes this distinction from Whewell. Mill writes, “The words
Nomenclature and Terminology are employed by most authors almost indiscriminately; Dr.
Whewell being, as far as I am aware, the first writer who has regularly assigned to the two
words different meanings” [12, p. 492].
5
Mill insists that science will need names for more than just Kinds. He does
think that Kinds will should appear in a proper scientific classification, and so
Kinds qualify as natural groups — but he insists that a complete classification
will require more categories than there are Kinds. He writes, “The distinctions
between Kinds are not numerous enough to make up the whole of classification”
[12, p. 503].
The natural groups which are not Kinds distinguish the important qualities
of things. This is subject to the worry that importance depends on human
concerns. Mill recognizes this worry, acknowledging that farmers divide plants
differently than botanists and that geologists divide fossils differently than zo-
ologists [12, p. 500]. If this were the end of it, then natural groups (besides
those which correspond to Kinds) would not be real features of the world. They
would be determined by our sense of what is important, shaped by our projects
and interest. Different concerns could make for different taxa.
Mill avoids this result by saying that the natural groups are the ones which
would figure in the science of a disinterested enquirer. He writes that
when we are studying objects not for any special practical end, but
for the sake of extending our knowledge of the whole of their proper-
ties and relations, we must consider as the most important attributes
those which. . . would most impress the attention of a spectator who
knew all their properties by was not especially interested in any.
Classes formed on this principle may be called, in a more emphatic
manner than any others, natural groups. [12, pp. 500–1]
Natural groups would be identified by an ideal, neutral observer. So they are
objective in the sense of not being dependent on any particular subjective stand-
point.
Mill’s characterization of natural groups as the categories of an intersub-
jectively warranted taxonomy diverges from his characterization of Kinds as
determined by objective laws of coexistence. The two characterizations do not
pick out the same categories, and their rationale is importantly different. Nat-
ural groups are defined in terms of possible or ideal enquiry, whereas Kinds are
defined just in terms of how the world is.
By contrast, although Whewell provides characterizations of Natural Classes
both as objects of possible enquiry and as features of the world, for him the
difference is just one of exposition. As we saw, Whewell thought that ideal
scientific enquiry should divide things by their essential constitutions.
To put the difference in our terms, we might approach natural kinds by way
of taxonomy or by way of ontology. For Whewell, this makes no difference, and
any legitimate scientific categories can be approached from either direction. For
Mill, the two do not perfectly coincide. Beginning with taxonomy, we get a
wealth of natural groups. Beginning with ontology, we get just the Kinds.
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4 Mill’s critics
In an 1887 attack on Mill’s “doctrine of natural kinds”, M.H. Towry enumerates
four objections to Mill’s account.8 For our purposes, we can treat them as raising
two broader worries.9
One worry is epistemic and semantic. According to Mill, we frame an ar-
bitrary class by stipulating properties which hold of its members. The class
of white things is specified just by the property white. Towry accepts this and
argues that the same is true for all classes and kinds. She writes:
Nature has in reality neither the class White Things nor the class
Horse. We made both. . . . There are a quantity of things in the
universe, alike in point of being white; there are a quantity of things
alike in points a b c, &c. = Horses. The properties are not found by
the Kind, but the Kinds are formed by the properties. [16, p. 436]
So, Towry writes, “one class is no whit less a merely intellectual creation than
the other” [16, p. 436].
Another worry is metaphysical. Mill posits a difference in kind between
Kinds and mere classes, but Towry objects that there is at most a differ-
ence in degree. There are anomalies and intermediate cases. Towry invokes
Whewell, writing that “Whewell’s type-theory seems to me nearer the truth
than Mill’s impassable barriers, because it recognizes infinite gradations and
interminglings” [16, p. 438]. But Towry dissents from both Whewell and Mill
by insisting that Kinds are just nominal classes. She writes, “When we advance
beyond Singulars to many individuals or substances forming a ‘natural Kind,’
we have made an arbitrary and conventional combination” [16, p. 438]. That is
to say, the Kind does not correspond to anything in nature.
I think that Mill can fairly be seen to anticipate the first worry. He recognizes
that the semantics for Kinds must be different than the semantics for stipulated
groups, and so he holds that the term for a Kind has a different connotation than
the term for an arbitrary class. The term for an arbitrary class consists merely
of some stipulated attributes. The term for a Kind consists of some attributes
which distinguish the class along with the commitment to that class’s being a
Kind.10
8Although Franklin and Franklin (whom I discuss below) address their reply to “Mr.
Towry”, it seems likely that the author was Mary Helen Towry White. She published on
a range of topics — from the history of Scottish clans to stories of famous children — and
was credited under different variations of her name. My inability to decisively confirm that
this is the same Towry is an example of how women who contributed to philosophical debates
are made to disappear from our retelling of them.
9Towry begins with a fair and concise summary of Mill’s view: “Mill says that a Kind
is one of those classes which are distinguished from all others, not by one or a few definite
properties, but by an unknown multitude of them; the combination of properties on which the
class is grounded being a mere index to an indefinite number of other distinctive attributes,
and instances Plant, Animal, Sulphur, Horse, &c., as Kinds” [16, p. 435].
10Regarding terms for Kinds, Mill writes, “besides connoting certain attributes, they also
connote that those attributes are distinctive of a Kind” [12, p. 493]. This is an explicit point
of contrast with Whewell. On Whewell’s account, we identify an exemplary individual as the
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I think that Mill also has a ready response to Towry’s second worry, because
he only introduces Kinds as a way to understand how inductive generalization is
possible. If Towry’s worry were legitimate, then there would be no difference in
the world between real groups (like phosphorus) and an arbitrarily concatenated
group (like the union of phosphorus and sandwiches) — but then there would be
no more ground to generalize from samples of phosphorus than from samples of
phosphorus-or-sandwiches. This point is especially clear in hindsight, because
we are familiar with Goodman’s new riddle of induction. Even though philoso-
phers may disagree about what distinguishes ‘emerald’ from ‘emerose’ (where
‘emerose’ picks out all the observed emeralds and all the unobserved roses) it
is clear that something does. To put the point in terms which were available
to Mill’s 19th-century critics: Making sense of science requires that there be
some distinction between arbitrary and non-arbitrary classes. Insofar as Mill is
aiming at that distinction, there is something right about his notion of Kinds.11
There are two published replies to Towry.12 In the second of these, Fabian
Franklin and Christine Ladd Franklin concede to Towry that there may be no
fundamental difference between the mental operations by which we come to
think of arbitrary classes and natural kinds but insist that there is nonetheless
an important difference between them in the world. They begin, “The doctrine
of Kinds, as laid down by Mill, does not seem to be tenable. . . yet there is,
we think, a real difference between such classes and mere arbitrary classes; and
the nature of that difference may be stated very nearly as Mill stated it” [3,
p. 83]. Although they accept that any category is “an intellectual creation”
they maintain that it could not be “a merely intellectual creation” [3, p. 84].
Mill’s mistake, the Franklins suggest, was to suppose that what holds a
Kind together is a fundamental non-causal regularity which cannot be explained.
Rather, they suggest that the connection can be explained by either a causal
regularity or a historical connection between different members of the Kind.
They write:
When a certain set of qualities entails the presence of others, and the
supposition cannot be entertained that there is a causal connexion of
a general nature between them, the conclusion is inevitable. . . that
type, and the Kind is the class of things which are sufficiently similar to the type specimen.
On Mill’s account, we identify a list of properties which are diagnostic of the Kind, and the
Kind is the class of things which share the diagnostic properties and indefinitely many more.
As Whewell would have it, we read the diagnostic properties off of a designated type specimen.
Mill allows that we can imagine a type specimen, but he thinks that we do so by imagining a
thing with all of the diagnostic properties. [12, pp. 501–5] Schwartz [14] provides an extended
discussion of Mill’s semantics for Kind terms.
11One might worry that my reading of Mill describes Kinds as independent of enquiry, but
the reply to Towry defends Kinds by appealing to the possibility of enquiry. Such a worry is
easily defused: Although making sense of enquiry provides Mill’s reason for positing Kinds,
Kinds are not defined in terms of enquiry.
12In the first of these, W.H.S. Monck [13] insists that taxonomy is not a subject which
should be addressed by a logician at all, since it concerns knowledge of what the world is
actually like. This objection is oddly hidebound. It is obvious in the sections on Kinds and
categories that Mill, like Whewell before him, is doing philosophy of science.
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there is a certain community of origin among the objects possessing
that set of qualities. [3, p. 84]
By ‘community of origin’ they mean some common cause; that is, that members
of a natural kind have a shared history which explains their shared features.
Common cause provides a way to explain regularity, without it being the
unconditional result of causal or non-causal laws. Because of their common
history, the members of such a Kind will share features beyond those which we
initially notice or by which we diagnose membership in the Kind; when “we
regard the invariable concomitance of certain qualities with certain other marks
as proof of a common origin in the objects possessing those marks, there is no
reason for setting any limit to the number of ways in which that common origin
will be betrayed” [3, p. 85].
A consequence of this proposal is that Mill’s exemplary Kinds turn out to
be a disparate lot. Biological species are groups of common descent, and so
they can be explained by community of origin. Yet chemical kinds do not seem
to be. Rather, it seems more likely that chemical regularities are a matter of
causal law. Considering the example of sodium, the Franklins write, “there is
not. . . any external evidence that all the sodium. . . in the universe was derived
from a common stock; but it seems highly probably that either this is the case
or else that all the properties of sodium are deducible by general laws from a
few of them. . . [that] the properties of sodium are deductions from its molecular
constitution” [3, p. 85]. The only general thing to say about Kinds is that their
unity can be explained either by general laws or by common causes — i.e.,
“either the qualities or the objects have a real connexion with each other” [3,
p. 85].
This furthers the division between taxonomy and ontology that we saw al-
ready in Mill’s account. For Mill, some but not all natural groups correspond
to Kinds in the world. So the characterization of the criteria for what makes a
category natural is separate from the metaphysical description of what it is in
the world which satisfies those criteria. Franklin and Franklin drive the wedge
further, by suggesting that different categories might be realized in the world in
fundamentally different ways. Some natural groups, like chemical elements, are
unified because members of the kind have a similar composition and so behave
similarly according to general, causal laws. Others, like biological species, are
unified by sharing a historical source and so behave similarly because of their
common cause.
5 Conclusion
If we treat the 19th-century discussions as an anticipation of debates about
natural kinds in the last 50 years, Mill has two separate notions which might
be mapped onto our present term ‘natural kind’: Kinds and natural groups. As
is usual in the history of philosophy, it would be a gross over-simplification to
treat this simply as a matter of translation. The fact that there is not one clear
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counterpart to our term ‘natural kind’ suggests that, in some sense, Mill was
not thinking about natural kinds the way that we do.
We should not pretend that Mill had two entangled notions where we now
simply have one. Quite the contrary, we can distinguish the taxonomy and
ontology questions about what we call natural kinds. First, what criteria dis-
tinguish natural kinds from arbitrary categories? Second, what features of the
world make some categories but not others satisfy these criteria?
Failure to mind this distinction can be seen to lead to confusion in recent
debates. Establishing this is beyond the scope of this paper, but I will point to
one suggestive illustration: The idea that natural kinds are homeostatic property
clusters (HPCs) is most plausible if we treat it as an answer to the ontology
question for many but not all natural kinds. Yet many authors respond to HPC
accounts just by providing examples of natural kinds which are not HPCs or of
HPCs which are not natural kinds. Those counterexamples are only relevant if
we take HPCs as an answer to the both questions, to define both what it is to
be a natural kind and what a natural kind is in the world.13
We should reject the usual historical account, according to which Mill’s
Kinds matured into our natural kinds. We understand Mill better if we recognize
that he was struggling with separate issues, and that he introduced several
notions to resolve them. To revisit Hacking’s metaphor: The scholastic darkness
which shadows present discussions of natural kinds may be dissolved not by
abandoning natural kinds altogether but by recognizing complexities too often
overlooked. We would do well to let a Millian flower bloom.
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